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Introduction
I remember myself as a child growing up in the fifties, thinking, “How 
lucky I am to be an American.” How sad it would be to come from some­
where else, I thought, to be French or Italian, perhaps. Wouldn’t everyone, 
if they could, choose to be American? By the late eighties, three decades 
later, David Remnick, then a writer for the Washington Post, complained 
that the United States had become “second-rate in business, culture, 
even sports,” and today this lament is echoed from left to right. Amer­
ica is “in warp speed decline,” writes C. J. Werleman for the liberal activ­
ist news service Alternet. “America is in trouble,” writes centrist New Yor\ 
Times columnist Thomas Freidman. “America is disintegrating,” writes 
conservative political commentator and former presidential hopeful Pat 
Buchanan. Hector Barreto, former chief of the U.S. Small Business Ad­
ministration and chair of the Latino Coalition, asks, “Are we the land of 
the American Dream, or the American Decline?”1
The repeated concern that the United States is in decline is odd. In 
many ways the America of today is a far, far better country than that of the
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fifties and sixties, a period frequently idealized as the high-water mark of 
U.S. prosperity and power. Living standards have risen. Life expectancy 
is up, and infant mortality are rates down. The air and water are cleaner. 
Crime rates are down. High school has become universal, and college is 
more accessible. Expression of sexuality is freer. Transportation is cheaper, 
safer, easier, and more efficient. Information is more available. Health care 
is more effective and finally—maybe—about to become more universally 
available. The danger of the United States engaging in nuclear war (at 
least all-out nuclear war between states) is lower. For huge groups of once 
marginalized people—women, African Americans, Latinos, other people 
of color, gay and bisexual men and women, transsexuals—the United 
States provides far greater freedom, far more opportunity, and far greater 
safety than it did a generation or two ago.
Given the gains in American society, the pervasive belief in decline and 
the pessimism infecting both pundits and the wider public calls out for 
explanation. Dating back a quarter of a century or more, it can’t be dis­
missed as nothing more than the result of the sluggish recovery from the 
Great Recession of 2008, the political gridlock of the Obama years, and 
the anxieties bred by the threats of terrorism, Ebola, and climate change. 
The national malaise reflects longer-term discontents and perhaps a dis­
tant, often-distorted memory of post—World War II America and a dim 
sense of the paths not taken. Though “decline” may be the wrong word, 
som eth ing has changed in the United States, and that something has pro­
duced a sense of looming crisis.
James Truslow Adams, who coined the phrase “the American Dream” 
in his 1931 book The Epic o f  America, defined it as “not a dream of motor 
cars and high wages merely, but a dream of social order in which each man 
and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they 
are innately capable, and be recognized by others for what they are, re­
gardless of the fortuitous circumstances of birth or position.”2 The Ameri­
can Dream was to live in a country characterized by freedom, based on the 
proposition that “all men are created equal,” a country ruled by “govern­
ment of the people, by the people, and for the people.”
In the years after World War II, the American Dream seemed alive and 
thriving. Free at last from the Great Depression, Americans looked for­
ward to steadily rising incomes and upward mobility. Advances in medi­
cine, communications (television), transportation (jet planes), and energy
(“the promise of the peaceful atom”) pro 
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d upward mobility. Advances in medi- 
transportation (jet planes), and energy
(“the promise of the peaceful atom”) promised ever-improving health and 
well-being. The United States had become the world center of both high 
culture (art, dance, music, literature) and mass culture (Hollywood movies, 
comic books, rock ’n’ roll, and television). The country was certainly too 
large to be a community, but in cities and in small towns, despite ethnic, 
racial, and religious friction and hostility, a sense of community, shared 
values and purposes, and collectivity survived. In the wake of the New 
Deal, the belief that government could and should intervene to guarantee 
the common welfare was generally accepted.
In retrospect, it is easy to see the illusions and fantasies that underlay 
the American Dream. In the South, Jim Crow still ruled, and lynching was 
far from a thing of the past. In the North, rigid housing segregation, job 
discrimination, and hostility of whites towards blacks were the rule, not 
the exception. Throughout the land, a third of Americans lived in poverty. 
The “red scare” made neighbor suspicious of neighbor and suppressed dis­
sent, and the threat of nuclear annihilation hung over all. A cult of confor­
mity masked deep divisions in society. Still, imperfect though things might 
be, there was a widespread belief that the country’s story was one of prog­
ress and the gradual expansion of democracy. The progressive social gains 
of the New Deal were a beginning, not an end. “Our marching song will 
come again,” proclaimed leftist Earl Robinson’s “Ballad for Americans,” 
sung at the 1940 Republican National Convention, at the 1940 Commu­
nist Party National Convention, and by two hundred African American 
soldiers at a wartime concert in London. The song was recorded by both 
Paul Robeson and Bing Crosby. And the faith seemed justified. Only a few 
years later, the civil rights movement, the black liberation and community 
control movements, the Great Society and the War on Poverty, the New 
Left and the sixties counterculture, and the modern feminist, gay rights, 
and environmental movements transformed the country and its people.
Now, however, half a century later, despite easily documented gains in 
wealth and well-being, that world of faith in the American Dream seems 
long gone. Politics are gridlocked and impotent in the face of a faltering 
economy, climate change, and a dozen other problems. We have lurched, 
apparently rudderless, from the dot.com boom of the late nineties to the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the following recession, from the triumphal 
end of the Cold War to a disastrous preemptive war in Iraq and an appar­
ently endless “war against terror.” The country’s public schools, once the
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wonder of the world, seem to lag behind those of a dozen other, poorer 
countries. The American health-care system is the most expensive, least 
accessible, and one of the least effective in the industrialized world.
In 2015, the economy of the richest country in the history of the world 
seems to be unraveling. Long before the Great Recession, we were losing 
competitiveness to the Chinese and others, and today, years after the finan­
cial crisis, we are still unable to climb out of the financial pit dug for us by 
the banks. For decades, wages have stagnated, income and wealth inequal­
ity has grown, the poverty rate has remained stuck at mid-1970s levels, and 
the social safety net has deteriorated. Families have only been able to main­
tain their standard of living by working more (the dual-income family is 
now the norm) and by borrowing to stretch their income. The price, not 
surprisingly, has been increased pressure on individuals and on the family 
as a unit, with concomitant political tension.
While racial attitudes of whites may have softened, racial inequities 
persist at an institutional level, and individual racism and bigotry is still 
widespread. Poverty in America remains concentrated among people of 
color. The rate of incarceration of black men (mainly for nonviolent drug 
offenses) is five times that for white men, and, sixty years after Brown vs. 
Board o f  Education, well over a third of black students nationwide (and al­
most two-thirds of black students in New York and Illinois) attend a school 
with fewer than 10 percent white students.3 Hundreds of thousands of “il­
legal immigrants,” most of them people of color and many raised in the 
United States since childhood, are unceremoniously deported each year. 
Other issues, such as abortion, gay and transgender rights, and gun control, 
provoke bitter division along the familiar Red State and Blue State lines.
As for the government’s role in providing for the common welfare, it 
has lost out to free market ideology and a belief in unbridled individual­
ism. In the United States these days, freedom seems to be less about the 
absence of constraint than about freedom from obligations to one another. 
Social critics have documented a decades-long decline in the sense of com­
munity and decried the rampant greed, litigiousness, consumerism, and 
belligerent egoism of today. The very idea of the common well-being has 
all but disappeared from political discourse. U.S. citizens, even before 2008, 
seemed to be experiencing a loss of optimism with respect to the future and 
with respect to the country’s collective ability to solve pressing problems.
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So what happened? How did we go from “how lucky I am to be an 
American” to “the American Dream is in trouble”? What complex shifts in 
American society have led to the perception of irreversible decline despite 
the real gains for so many? What do they mean for families and personal 
lives, for the way we educate children, for the way we deal with sickness 
and health, for our chances of personal happiness? Is it possible for us to 
recapture that sense of community and hope that once bound us together? 
Or are political polarization and paralysis, growing inequality, ongoing ra­
cial disparities, popular alienation from government, virulent individual­
ism, concern about what our schools are teaching, and inability to confront 
challenges such as climate change and globalization here to stay.
Some of the fears of decline may be transient, rooted in the depth and 
intransigence of the post-2008 recession, and some of the claims that the sky 
is falling may be motivated chiefly by ideological agendas. Yet to describe 
what has happened in recent decades as nothing more than “the inevitabil­
ity of change” is insufficient. There is a coh eren ce  to the changes, distin­
guishing the United States of recent decades from that of my childhood. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, the American political economy underwent 
a major transformation. Just as the Industrial Capitalism of the nineteenth 
century gave way to the Corporate Capitalism of the first two-thirds of 
the twentieth century, in recent decades the latter has given way to a new 
phase—the era of “Third Wave Capitalism.”
Conceptualizing the last five decades as the onset of a new phase in the 
history of American capitalism helps resolve and explain the apparent con­
tradictions of recent history—the growth of poverty amid growing wealth, 
the apotheosis of individual freedom and the paralysis of democracy, the 
election of a black president and the incarceration of a million black men, 
the increase in educational attainment and the growing mismatch between 
student skills and the needs of the job market, and the increasingly sophis­
ticated medical technology and the decline in health indicators compared 
to other affluent countries.4
Chapter 1 provides a deeper, more systematic look at the sources and es­
sential characteristics of Third Wave Capitalism. Like Industrial Capital­
ism and Corporate Capitalism before it, Third Wave Capitalism is marked 
by distinctive forms of economic enterprise, new technologies, a dramatic 
expansion of markets, new modes for the accumulation of wealth, a
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changed relationship between the public and private sectors, new patterns 
of social conflict, and shifts in ideology.
Subsequent chapters provide examples that flesh out these somewhat 
abstract conceptualizations. Chapters 2 and 3 look at the U.S. health-care 
system and educational system, respectively. The health-care system, 
which evolved into its current form over the years after World War II and 
especially since the 1960s, is a “mature” Third Wave system, fully reveal­
ing the characteristic features of Third Wave Capitalism. By contrast, 
the school system was forged during the eras of Industrial and Corporate 
Capitalism. The drive to reform it, based on the claim that our schools are 
failing, is a concerted effort to transform American schools into a Third 
Wave system that can generate profits for the private sector as efficiently as 
the health-care system does.
Chapters 3 and 4 turn to the impact of Third Wave Capitalism on vari­
ous groups of U.S. citizens. Chapter 4 focuses on the collapse of sixties’ ef­
forts to “eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty” and “close 
the springs of racial poison” (to use President Lyndon Johnson’s phrases) 
and examines the persistence of poverty and racial disparities. The aban­
donment of the poor, the retreat from commitments to end racial discrimi­
nation and racial disparities, and the turn to the criminal justice system to 
exert social control reflect the most extreme version of Third Wave Capi­
talism’s more general retreat from collective solutions to societal ills.
Chapter 5 looks at the fate of the privileged upper end of the American 
middle class. The liberal and creative professions (e.g., lawyers, teachers, 
writers) were once able to maintain a position of relative autonomy, largely 
outside the corporate framework. From their privileged positions, profes­
sionals could dream of a society ruled by reason. But in recent years, cuts 
in public spending and the rise in new technologies, offshoring, and direct 
ideological attack have undermined their position, and along with it, their 
dreams for America.
Chapter 6 explores the cultural and psychological impact of Third 
Wave Capitalism. It examines the rise in individual distress in recent years, 
expressed sometimes as depression, anxiety, and loneliness, sometimes as 
political rage. These join economic inequality and political gridlock as cen­
tral components of our national malaise. The distress is rooted in changes 
in typical personality patterns, a response to the demands that Third Wave
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economic and cultural stresses that Third Wave Capitalism has created.
The epilogue that follows is less a conclusion or set of proposals or 
plan for political action than exploration of the potential for progressive 
change—and of obstacles to it.
A few caveats: I have made no effort to make Third Wave Capitalism 
encyclopedic. Many important aspects of the American experience of re­
cent decades will appear only incidentally. These include the changing sta­
tus of women, the situation of economically disadvantaged ethnic groups 
such as Latinos, the national debates about reproductive rights and gay 
marriage and gender identity, the impact of massive immigration (docu­
mented and undocumented), and the threat of global warming.
I also focus on what has happened within the United States and do not 
address the country’s decline in power relative to the rest of the world. 
I have treated world events such as the Vietnam War and the “war on 
terror” as external, making no effort to explore the reciprocal interaction 
between what happens here and what happens elsewhere. The two are 
not independent, of course. The decline of U.S. power on a world scale, 
the confusion of purpose, the lack of moral compass leading to our war of 
aggression in Iraq and to waterboarding and “external rendition” certainly 
contribute to the national malaise.
I also do not examine the development of capitalism in other countries. 
Many of the changes in the United States in recent decades can be seen 
in other “advanced” democracies as well, but I have not attempted to ad­
dress the similarities and differences between what has happened here and 
elsewhere. While history may be shaped by grand forces, its working out is 
full of particularities and the influences of very specific and local histories.
Others have analyzed many of the specific issues addressed in this 
book, of course, and I have relied judiciously on these secondary sources. 
My hope is that putting these analyses together in a new way will be 
illuminating.
Finally, the passage of time creates an inherent problem with any book 
about current affairs. Events inevitably outrun the production cycle of a 
book. Congress or the Supreme Court may yet cripple the Affordable Care 
Act. The Common Core Curriculum (or at least the testing regime associ­
ated with it) may implode under the pressure of the “opt out” movement.
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The minimum wage may be increased. Revulsion at police killings of un­
armed black people may lead to reform of policing tactics. But none of 
these developments would invalidate the insights into the dynamics of the 
health-care system, the politics of the school reform movement, or the state 
of the black community provided by my analysis of the dynamics of Third 
Wave Capitalism.
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T hird W ave C apit alism
Looking back on the decades since World War II from the vantage point 
of 2015, the gods would seem to have looked with favor upon America. 
Our economy has boomed. New technologies have transformed our lives. 
Our standard of living is much, much higher than it was. Americans are 
healthier and better educated than ever before. While inequalities and big­
otry certainly remain, people of color, women, and gays and lesbians now 
know far greater freedom, opportunity, and security than in the years im­
mediately following the war.
But if we look back more carefully, the view gets more complicated. 
From the end of World War II until the 1970s, despite turmoil and ups 
and downs, evidence of progress in the United States is clear. But some­
where in the 1970s or early 1980s the road turned sharply. In some areas, 
progress came to a dead halt. In other areas, we, the American people, took 
what now seems to be a wrong road. In a few areas, progress was even 
reversed.
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Consider a few examples (all of which I will return to later, in more 
detail):
• From World War II until the early 1970s, Americans from all socio­
economic strata benefited from economic growth. But beginning in the 
seventies, productivity and incomes became uncoupled, and inequal­
ity grew. In the late 1970s, the richest .01 percent of Americans owned 
7 percent of our aggregate wealth, a 30 percent low er  proportion than 
thirty years earlier. Today they own 22 percent. In the late 1970s, the 
richest 1 percent took home 10 percent of aggregate wages; today they 
take home over 20 percent. Though productivity has increased by 
120 percent since 1979, inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings for 
production and nonsupervisory workers (everyone but higher paid 
managers and supervisors) went up only 0.1 percent per year between 
1979 and 2014.'
• By virtually any measure of health status, Americans are far healthier 
today than they were decades ago. Life expectancy is up, mortality rates 
are down, and effective treatments for many diseases, nonexistent fifty 
or sixty years ago, have become routine. But the price has been high. 
Health-care spending as a percent of GDP has risen 250 percent since 
1970. Inability to pay medical bills accounts for more than half of all 
family bankruptcies. And by international standards, at least, what we 
get for the $2.9 trillion we pay each year for health care isn’t very good. 
Americans experience more illnesses and have shorter lives than people 
in other high-income countries. In 1960, the country’s infant mortality 
rate ranked twelfth among the thirty-four countries in the Organiza­
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ahead of 
Japan, Canada, Germany, and France. Today the United States has 
fallen to thirtieth in infant mortality, behind Greece, Poland, and Slo­
vakia. Most of the relative decline has occurred since 1980. Within the 
United States, huge disparities remain. A male black infant born today 
can expect to live four years less than his white counterpart, and for 
poor people with less than a high school education, mortality rates are 
actually rising.2
• Americans today are far better educated than years ago. The average 
number of years spent in school, the percentage of Americans of all so­
cial classes who are high school graduates, the percentage who are col­
lege graduates, and (despite what you may have heard) students’ test 
scores are all up dramatically. Students from all over the world come 
to attend U.S. colleges and universities and even high schools. But most
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of the reduction in the gaps in academic achievement between white 
and black and between white and Latino students occurred during 
the 1970s. The gap barely changed in the two decades following and 
has narrowed only slightly over the last fifteen years. The difference 
between the proportion of children of poor people and the proportion 
of children of rich people attending or completing college has doubled 
since the 1970s. And at least since “A Nation at Risk,” the 1983 report 
of the Reagan administration’s National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, we have been inundated with claims that our schools are 
failing, that students’ skills are falling behind the rest of the world, and 
that U.S. students are not being prepared for the job market.3
• Jim Crow is no more, and the income, health, and educational statuses 
of African Americans today are dramatically better than in the 1950s. 
For most white Americans, open expressions of racism have become 
unacceptable. A large black middle class has emerged, and we have a 
black president and countless elected black officials at lower levels. But 
the gaps between black and white in schooling, unemployment rates, 
and income have barely narrowed since the mid-1970s. Since the 1980s, 
school segregation has been rising again, in both the North and the 
South. Today one quarter of all of black children in New Jersey attend 
super-segregated schools, with fewer than 1 percent nonblack children. 
A growing proportion of blacks live in predominately poor neighbor­
hoods. And, beginning in 1980, the rate of incarceration of black men 
has risen dramatically. Today, the N ew Yorf( Times headlines, some 
1.5 million black men are “missing” from their communities, either 
languishing in prison or prematurely dead.4
• Between 1960 and 1975, the proportion of Americans living in pov­
erty dropped by more than half. By 1973, the poverty rate was down to 
11 percent. But it then rose a bit, and it has never again reached its 1973 
low point. Meanwhile, the proportion of the poor who are in “deep pov­
erty”—who have incomes less than half the official poverty level—has 
steadily risen, from 30 percent in 1975 to 44 percent today.5
• Despite rising wealth, personal misery and a sense of personal isolation 
have increased. Rates of depression are up and levels of self-reported 
anxiety among young people have doubled since 1980. Meanwhile, 
sources of social support have declined. The number of Americans who 
say that they have no “confidant” rose two-and-one-half-fold between 
1985 and 2004. Sociologists have documented a decline in social trust in 
recent decades, especially among the less educated. Despite increasingly 
shrill proclamations of religiosity, church attendance, once a source of 
solace for many, has dropped precipitously since the mid-1970s.6
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• The first two-thirds of the twentieth century brought wave after wave 
of progressive reform—the Progressive Era of Teddy Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson, FDR’s New Deal, Truman’s Fair Deal, and John­
son’s Great Society. Regulation of banks and of the transportation, 
food, drug, and other industries, the development of the “social safety 
net,” governmental guarantees of minimum wages and maximum 
hours and the right to unionize, unemployment compensation, work­
place safety rules, anti-discrimination laws, and controls over air and 
water pollution made Americans safer, less exploited as workers and 
consumers, and more secure in the face of the vagaries of employment 
and the inevitability of old age. There were periods of backsliding, of 
course, but rarely for long. Looked at from a distance, progress was 
steady. But in the early 1970s, the reforms came to an abrupt halt and 
militant conservatism became increasingly triumphant. There was Re­
publican Nixon’s “southern strategy” with its withdrawal from aggres­
sive enforcement of civil rights, Democrat Jimmy Carter’s onslaught 
against transportation industry regulation, Republican Ronald Rea­
gan’s proclamation that “government is not the solution, government 
is the problem,” Republican George H. W. Bush’s deregulation of the 
energy industry, and Democrat Bill Clinton’s embrace of deep cuts in 
welfare, bank deregulation, and harsh prison sentences for minor of­
fenses. After Republican George W. Bush’s effort to cut taxes for the 
rich, and in the face of ever-more-entrenched and ever-more-powerful 
conservative opposition, Barack Obama’s claim of “yes we can” seems 
ever more hollow.
Many other examples could be given. In sphere after sphere of Amer­
ican life, the seventies and early eighties are an inflection point. Before, 
there was progressive change. After, there was not.
There are what seem to be exceptions, of course, most notably in the 
gains in the status of women. But looked at more closely, the course of 
modern feminism shows a similar pattern, peaking in the early 1970s, then 
falling back. State ratification of the 1972 Equal Rights Amendment had 
stalled out by 1977. The 1973 Roe v. Wade decision (disallowing most state 
and federal restrictions on abortion) was followed by a wave of increas­
ingly successful efforts to chip away at women’s reproductive rights. By 
the 1980s, the feminist movement had become increasingly fragmented, 
fraught with dissension, and imperiled by backlash. Even the gains in 
women’s employment and income may have reflected the growing need
Third Wave Capitalism 13
for families to have two wage earners, if they were to maintain their living 
standard in the face of stagnant wages, as much as support for women’s 
rights.
So what’s going on here? Let’s step back for a moment. The change of 
course that is evident in U.S. history since the 1970s is not merely a super­
ficial, retrospective grouping together of unrelated events. Inequality, po­
litical paralysis and the conservative onslaught, the crises in the American 
health care system and in American education, the collapse of efforts to 
end poverty and racial disparities, the rise in personal misery and political 
rage, all traceable to the 1970s and early 1980s, are not just a random col­
lection of isolated problems. They represent the emergence of a new stage 
in the history of American capitalism.
Historians often divide American social, political, and economic history 
since the early nineteenth century into two phases, the age of Industrial 
Capitalism and the age of Corporate Capitalism. Each of these phases was 
characterized by the emergence of distinctive forms of economic enter­
prise, by novel technologies and radically new modes of transportation and 
communication, by expansion in the extent of the market, by changes in 
the modes through which wealth was accumulated, by shifts in the re­
lationship between public and private sectors, by evolution of the typical 
forms of social conflict, and by distinctive ideologies. Since the 1970s, we 
have entered a third phase, the phase I call “Third Wave Capitalism.” (For 
discussion of this terminology, see below).
The First Two Waves: Industrial Capitalism 
and Corporate Capitalism
The age of Industrial Capitalism—the era of the Erie Canal and the 
transcontinental railroad, of Morse’s telegraph and McCormick’s 
reaper and Edison’s electric light bulb, of small entrepreneurs but also 
of hyper-rich “robber barons” such as Andrew Carnegie and John D. 
Rockefeller—extended through most of the nineteenth century. The 
steam engine and the factory system revolutionized production. Railroads, 
steamboats, and the telegraph and telephone revolutionized transporta­
tion and communications, widening markets. Great fortunes were made 
in railroads, mining, and basic industry. Though its role was minimal by
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later standards, the federal government subsidized the railroads, indi­
rectly subsidized manufacturing through the tariff system, and promoted 
the settlement of the West. Local and state governments helped maintain 
order, which included helping to break strikes and repress the recently 
freed black population in the post-Reconstruction South. This was a tur­
bulent period in the United States, with social and economic conflict man­
ifest in the Civil War, pitting region against region and manufacturers 
against plantation owners, in widespread strikes, pitting workers against 
their employers, and in regional political battles such as the Populist strug­
gles, pitting southern and Plains State farmers against banks and railroads 
and their allies.
Then, around the end of the nineteenth century, Corporate Capitalism 
began to emerge. Giant joint stock companies and giant banks increasingly 
dominated the American economy. Technological advances in chemistry 
and electricity, the rise of the petroleum industry, and the development of 
the internal combustion engine—what some called “the second industrial 
revolution”—led to the emergence of the automobile industry, electrical 
utilities, and broadcasting. Soon the automobile and the truck and the 
radio permitted the development of a truly national marketplace. Rapid 
urbanization, wave upon wave of immigration from eastern and south­
ern Europe, and the great northward migration of blacks from the rural 
South transformed the American workforce and the American landscape. 
“Scientific management” reorganized work processes, turning individual 
workers into little more than appendages of the machines they operated. 
In response to financial crises, labor unrest, and middle-class outrage over 
excesses of industrial capital such as those described in Upton Sinclair’s 
The Jungle, both government and corporations were forced to accommo­
date to some degree to the needs of workers, farmers, and consumers. At 
the same time, corporate leaders began to see the state as a mechanism that 
could directly serve their needs. Progressive Era reforms such as railroad 
rate regulation, the Pure Food and Drug Act, and the Federal Reserve Act 
not only protected consumers and small businesses but also helped ratio­
nalize industries, stabilize the economy, and protect corporations against 
more radical demands from workers and farmers/
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prises and the rise of a national market 
wages to permit higher consumption. In 
wages he paid his workers to five dollars
a day, doubling their previous rate. In legend, at least, Ford realized that 
paying higher wages to his workers would make it possible for them to 
buy his products. It was actually probably more an effort to reduce worker 
turnover in his plants and was accompanied by vastly increased scrutiny 
of the workers’ lives. But regardless of Ford’s own intentions, the under­
standing that higher wages would, in the end, help corporations make 
profits, triumphed. Of course, the argument that higher wages lead to 
higher consumption really only works at the level of society as a whole, not 
at the level of a single company. No matter what Boeing pays its workers, 
they won’t be able to themselves afford a 747. But if everyone pays their 
workers more, capitalists can benefit from higher sales. The Boeing work­
ers may be able to afford to buy tickets from American Airlines to fly on 
a 747 and a Samsonite suitcase to carry their belongings from one city to 
another.8
Struggles between workers and owners persisted at the level of indi­
vidual corporations, of course (as the great 1941 strike against Ford itself, 
among other labor battles, showed), but something new had been added. 
Now what happened to workers at a specific company was often insepara­
ble from what happened to workers in general. Struggles for economic jus­
tice took on an intercompany or even national form. In earlier times, most 
strikes had been local, pitting workers against the owners of an individual 
company. The new model was reflected in the emergence of industry-wide 
strikes, such as the steel strike of 1919, the textile workers’ strike of 1934, 
and the coal miners’ strike of 1946, and even citywide strikes such as the 
San Francisco general strike of 1934. It can also be seen in the develop­
ment of explicit or implicit industry-wide collective bargaining, as in the 
auto industry’s adoption of “pattern” settlements after World War II: 
Once the union reached a contract with one of the Big Three auto compa­
nies, the other companies copied it.
Sometimes big strikes took on an anticapitalist, “class struggle” tone, 
but in the wake of the 1946 strike wave, a general social compact emerged. 
Unions would accept the underlying class relationships of society, agree to 
long-term contracts that protected employers from the threat of frequent 
strikes, and give up the right to bargain over some issues, in exchange for 
employment stability, a steady increase in real wages, and extensive health 
and pension benefits and vacation time (all underwritten, of course, by in­
creases in productivity and monopoly control over pricing).
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The Rise of Third Wave Capitalism
Since the 1970s, American capitalism has evolved into a distinctive third 
phase, Third Wave Capitalism. This third phase of American capitalism 
is marked off from the preceding Corporate Capitalist period by the dra­
matic growth of globalization. Capital markets were internationalized. 
Foreign trade and investment grew dramatically, and the new multi­
national corporations created globally integrated supply chains, uniting 
under the control of a single enterprise the extraction of raw materials, 
production of parts, assembly of final products, and sales, with each pro­
cess occurring in a different geographic location. At home, U.S. manu­
facturing declined, its once proud place in the national economy taken 
over by service industries and the financial sector. Meanwhile giant non­
profit enterprises arose, coming to account for more than 10 percent of 
U.S. employment by the end of the twentieth century. Another wave of 
technological innovation, this time in electronics and materials, fueled an­
other historic shift in production, communications, and transportation. 
Free market, highly individualistic ideologies flourished, promoted by a 
well-financed and self-conscious propaganda barrage from conservative 
business leaders and media. The relationship between government and 
business became ever more intimate, and, correspondingly, the protec­
tions that the federal, state, and local governments offered the poor and 
the middle class began to fray (see table 1).
A word about my use of the term “Third Wave Capitalism” to de­
scribe this phase in American history. Many others have explored changes 
in the United States over recent decades (though not always focusing on 
the same changes or on precisely the same time frame) and have sought a 
way to name them. Each of the other leading candidates is deeply prob­
lematic, however. “Global capitalism” implies that the economic world 
is far more integrated than the real world actually is and falsely suggests 
that developments in the United States are closely mirrored in other capi­
talist countries, including not only the countries of Western Europe but

countries such as China, Russia, and Brazil.12 “Finance capitalism” focuses 
on a very important shift in our economy, but financialization alone has 
little power to explain the many changes in U.S. politics, economics, and 
culture.13 “Late capitalism,” espoused by many in the humanities, is vague 
and leaves us with the problem of what we will call the inevitable next 
phase of capitalism (“later capitalism”?).14 “Neoliberal capitalism,” a favor­
ite among many Left scholars to refer to the renewed popularity of laissez 
faire economic ideas, uses the word “liberal” in a sense completely opposite 
to historic American usageT In Europe, “liberalism” implies small gov­
ernment and laissez faire economics, but in the United States the word is 
virtually synonymous with strong government and support for the welfare 
state. None of these terms will do. “Third Wave Capitalism” simply sets 
off the current phase of American capitalism from the two earlier phases, 
with no obvious downside.
In a deeper sense, the difficulty in coming up with a more precisely 
descriptive label is itself telling. The Industrial Revolution was the over­
whelmingly dominant force in shaping the era of Industrial Capitalism, 
and the rise of the giant corporation was equally central to the era of Cor­
porate Capitalism. But no one institution or process dominates the changes 
in of recent decades. If anything, in Third Wave Capitalism the bound­
aries between institutions and between processes—between business and 
government, money and politics, profit and nonprofit, race and class, war 
and peace, police and military, private and public, cultural practice and 
commodification, male and female—are increasingly blurry. The very 
vagueness of “Third Wave” turns out to be descriptive.
The Corporate Imperative
Where did the Third Wave come from? The most basic engine driving 
the transition to the new stage of American capitalism was the relentless 
search for corporate profits, at home and abroad. U.S. corporations have 
long sought foreign markets and invested in sources of raw materials. For­
eign investment and international trade grew gradually until the 1990s, 
then explosively penetrated into the most remote corners of the world. 
Today, at the top of the heap, some sixty giant international corporations, 
including companies such as General Electric, Exxon, AT&T, Walmart, 
and Pfizer, account for $30 trillion in annual revenues and $119 trillion in 
assets, and they employ seventy-two million people worldwide.16
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first of all to make available to the public quality goods and services at 
fair prices, thereby earning a profit that attracts investment to continue 
and enhance the enterprise, provide jobs, and build the economy. . . . The 
long-term viability of the corporation depends upon its responsibility to 
the society of which it is a part.”18
Beginning in the 1970s, however, American businesses shifted from this 
“stakeholder model” to a “shareholder model,” in which the immediate in­
terests of shareholders were practically all that mattered. By the late 1990s, 
the Business Roundtable had changed its tune. The principle objective of 
a business enterprise, it now said, “Is to generate economic returns to its 
owners . . . Ilf] the CEO and the directors are not focused on shareholder 
value, it may be less likely the corporation will realize that value.” The 
shareholders had won. Or, as Gordon Gecko said in the movie Wall Street, 
“Greed is good.”19
The long-term struggle between individual large corporations and their 
workers, clients, and smaller-scale competitors escalated, with the large 
corporations going on the offensive. In the face of a wave of labor unrest 
in the 1970s and growing competition from abroad, employers placed re­
newed emphasis on labor flexibility and on control over their workers. At 
home they shifted from long-term commitments to their employees to the 
use of temporary and part-time employees, freelancers, and other workers 
deemed “outside contractors.” Ever larger parts of both production and 
administration were outsourced to other domestic or foreign companies. 
Advances in automation technology increasingly permitted replacement 
of potentially obstreperous workers with lower-cost, more docile ma­
chines. Companies also showed a growing resistance to the pay and benefit 
demands of unions, and a greater willingness to vigorously fight union 
organizing campaigns and strikes. In the marketplace, Walmart, Home 
Depot, and other huge national retail chains used the savings from their 
enormous scale of operations, along with aggressive use of loss leaders, to 
drive millions of small retailers out of business. Small mom-and-pop retail 
establishments providing day-to-day commodities such as food, clothing, 
hardware, and books were driven out. This, in turn, contributed to the col­
lapse of smaller scale, “people-friendly” neighborhoods.20
The aggressiveness of large corporations was especially evident in 
banking and other financial institutions. Before the 1960s, banks were
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staid, heavily regulated institutions, investing mainly in government bills 
and bonds and short-term loans. Most corporate investment came from 
funds generated internally by the corporations themselves. But then, with 
Citibank’s CEO Walter Wriston leading the way, banks surged into retail 
banking and credit cards and into investing in equities and derivatives. As 
federal regulations were loosened, both consumer banks and investment 
firms began to invest heavily, often recklessly. The line between what in 
retrospect get called “reckless” sub-prime loans and “predatory” loans be­
came harder and harder to see, and the banks’ products—“derivatives” 
and other complex financial instruments—became less and less easy to un­
derstand. Today, four banking groups (JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank 
of America, and Wells Fargo) have assembled assets equal to 43 percent of 
the Gross Domestic Product of the United States, four times the relative 
amount they controlled twenty-five years ago.21
The Rise of Nonprofits
A second change in the organization of private enterprise, easily overlooked 
amid the rapid growth of multinational corporations, was the emergence 
of the giant nonprofit organization. There is nothing new about nonprof­
its, of course. What is new is their dramatic growth in numbers and in size. 
Today elementary and secondary schools, universities, hospitals, think 
tanks, social welfare organizations, charities, unions, trade associations, so­
cial clubs, fraternal societies, churches, foundations, and other types of or­
ganization categorized by the Internal Revenue Service as “not for profit” 
enterprises account for about 10 percent of U.S. employment, up tenfold 
since the early twentieth century and threefold or fourfold since 1960. By 
official estimates, nonprofit enterprises are responsible for 5.4 percent of 
the GDP, but this figure may significantly underestimate their impact, due 
to the way the statistics are gathered. Their annual revenues, $2.16 trillion in 
2012, are the equivalent of more than 13 percent of the GDP.22
What defines an enterprise as being “nonprofit” is not the absence of 
profits in the usual sense of the word (that is, revenues in excess of ex­
penses). A more accurate name would be “non-taxpaying organization.” 
A nonprofit is defined by the U.S. tax code as an organization ostensibly 
organized for purposes other than making a profit and that has no share­
holders to distribute profits to. In return for presumably serving some
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nity service, the organization is exempted from most income, property, 
and sales taxes.
Despite their benign name and aura of doing good, nonprofits are 
simply a variant form of business enterprise, and they are thoroughly in­
tegrated into the for-profit business system. Some provide essential ser­
vices to for-profit businesses. For example, the National Football League 
(NFL), the trade association for the $9-billion-a-year professional football 
business, was a nonprofit until it voluntarily relinquished its tax-exempt 
status under heavy political pressure in 2015. The NFL (as opposed to its 
individual franchises, which have never been nonprofit) had revenues of 
over $300 million in 2012. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, another non­
profit, spent over $1 billion between 2004 and 2014 lobbying for business 
interests.23 Other nonprofits serve as conduits for other companies to make 
profits. Nonprofit hospitals, for instance, provide an enormous market for 
the products of the pharmaceutical industry, and nonprofit charter schools 
provide a market for the products of testing companies such as Pearson. 
(I’ll have more to say about this in chapters 2 and 3.)
Nonprofits are also central to the research endeavors of for-profit enter­
prises. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act (the Patent and Trademark Act) permit­
ted universities and hospitals to patent products or processes discovered 
by their researchers using federal tax dollars and license them to for-profit 
companies. For example, the anticancer drug Taxol was developed by 
Florida State University (FSU) scientists with almost half a billion dollars 
in federal grants. FSU licensed it to drug maker Bristol Myers Squibb, 
which, after more research and testing, marketed it, accounting for almost 
$10 billion in wholesale revenue for the company. Other highly profitable 
drugs, including the anti-HIV drug Truvada (developed at Tufts and mar­
keted by Gilead), the anti-allergy drug Allegra (developed at Georgetown 
and marketed at Sanofi), and the anti-wrinkle drug Renova (developed 
at the University of Pennsylvania and marketed by Johnson and John­
son), have similar histories. A former president of the technology-heavy 
NASDAQ Stock Exchange estimated that no less than 30 percent of its 
value stems from university-based, federally funded research results, com­
mercialized due to the Bayh-Dole Act.-4
In all of these cases, nonprofits serve a legitimate role (though whether 
one deserving of tax exemption is debatable), but other nonprofit activities
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are less defensible. For example, a nonprofit may make purchases from 
companies linked to their board members. One 2007 study found that ad­
ministrators and directors were involved in insider arrangements at nearly 
half of large nonprofit organizations, including universities. Fraud and 
embezzlement associated with nonprofits is also common, totaling more 
than $40 billion a year from charities alone.25
Though they may not pay profits to shareholders, nonprofits may le­
gally use their income to pay their executives very well. In 2012, Cleveland 
Clinic paid its CEO, Delos Cosgrove, $3.17 million; Goodwill Industries 
paid CEO John L. Miller $3.21 million a year, Northeastern University 
paid its president Joseph Aoun $3.12 million; and the National Football 
League (while it was still claiming its tax-exempt status) paid its commis­
sioner Roger Goodell no less than $44 million. The pay of nonprofit CEOs, 
including bonuses, like that of their counterparts in for-profit companies, 
may be linked to their institution’s financial performance, with higher pay 
contingent upon the organization’s financial success.26
As if to emphasize the lack of any large difference between nonprof­
its and profit-making enterprises, nonprofits sometimes even decide that 
the business benefits of not having to pay taxes are not great enough to 
forego openly making profits for shareholders, and they seamlessly shift 
to become for-profit endeavors. In the 1990s, for example, the nonprofit 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurance plans were transformed into very 
profitable for-profit companies, shedding their former obligations to the 
community (which had included providing insurance coverage regardless 
of a customer’s health status and charging the same premiums to all con­
sumers). Anthem, the second-largest health insurer in the United States 
and the thirty-eight largest company altogether, with 2013 revenues of 
$71 billion and profits of $2.5 billion, is the most prominent member of 
this group.27
The Role of Technology
The shift to Third Wave Capitalism was also driven by the emergence 
of new technologies. Often these were the result of federal government 
investment, later adopted by and benefiting the private sector. Comput­
ers, originally developed in the 1940s as part of the war effort, were first 
adopted by big companies in the 1960s to control automated industrial
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i the 1990s, for example, the nonprofit 
ince plans were transformed into very 
edding their former obligations to the 
roviding insurance coverage regardless 
harging the same premiums to all con- 
sst health insurer in the United States 
my altogether, with 2013 revenues of 
on, is the most prominent member of
sm was also driven by the emergence 
vere the result of federal government 
>enefiting the private sector. Comput- 
0s as part of the war effort, were first 
1960s to control automated industrial
processes and to maintain business records, and they have since become 
ubiquitous. Container ships revolutionized the movement of goods. Cheap 
air transport (also the product of military development) moved passengers 
and goods rapidly. Communications satellites and the Internet (both de­
veloped by the federal government) made rapid long-distance communi­
cation cheap and reliable.
New technology transformed the way U.S. companies operated. Many 
routine jobs were eliminated, taken over by machines, and many new 
kinds of relatively skilled jobs were created. The transportation revolu­
tion made globally integrated production systems, export of production 
jobs abroad, and expansion of world trade possible and profitable.28 The 
communications revolution permitted outsourcing of many backroom 
operations—from routine clerical tasks to accounting, design, and legal 
services—and enabled coordination of increasingly global enterprises. By 
century’s end, home computers and the Internet, and then laptops, smart 
phones, and tablets, profoundly influenced popular culture as well as busi­
ness practices, undermining traditional senses of privacy and altering pat­
terns of interpersonal interaction.
Some have argued that technological advances themselves have driven 
economic growth in recent years and that recent technological change 
has transformed society in an unprecedented way. Some perspective is in 
order, however. Though recent technological developments have certainly 
had major economic, social, and cultural impacts, their uniqueness can be 
easily overestimated. With the possible exception of the computer, most 
technological changes of the last half-century had counterparts in earlier 
phases of capitalism. Ever since the beginnings of the Industrial Revolu­
tion in the first half of the nineteenth century, transportation and commu­
nication have become ever more efficient, ever faster, and ever cheaper. In 
comparison to what went before, industrial capitalism’s railroads, steam­
ships, and telegraph brought different parts of the world into contact with 
one another even more dramatically than has the Internet. Corporate 
capitalism’s tractors, insecticides, and fertilizers revolutionized agriculture 
around the world, leading to massive immigration, rural depopulation in 
the United States, and the continued rise of the country’s great cities. The 
medical advances of corporate capitalism saved children from infectious 
diseases and prolonged life, forever changing our perceptions of child­
hood, adolescence, and aging. The computers of Third Wave Capitalism
